Keys and authentication data are not protected either within or between networks Often, this data is sent across microwave links between the BTS and the BSC. The encrypted relationship is only between the mobile device and the BTS, therefore data is in plain text beyond the BTS. If you set up a “pirate” BSC (Base Station Controller) any mobile (2G) phone will handshake with the BSC (mandatory part of 2G). To explain how this works in simple terms: My advice (if you’re trying to avoid being located by people who might have this sort of technology) would be, don’t carry a cellphone. And if they can move around (triggerfish in unmarked vans, anyone?), your phone’s location can probably be pinpointed to within a few inches. But if an attacker wants to improve that accuracy, all he’s gotta do is introduce a couple of extra points of reference (cell towers, or triggerfish). Going the other way, the accuracy would be terrible around here because you’re lucky to be within range of one cell tower. Your Iphone is accurate to the city block. Which is also how somebody on the other side of things (running cell towers or triggerfish) would do it as well. Triangulate your position is based on your The ability of the first generation Iphone to It’s redundant, in other words, and changes nothing. So if your phone does transmit GPS information, I don’t think that gives anyone (well, anyone with cell towers or triggerfish) any information that they can’t get pretty easily anyway. It’s possible to triangulate your location based on the latency between you and various cell towers (or triggerfish), in much the same way that a GPS receiver determines your location based on the latency from various satellites. Probably count your own government spyingįor that matter, listening in on cellphone conversations is generally even easier than pinpointing the location of a particular phone.Īnd yes, the government is obviously not the only organization that could ever make use (or misuse) of this kind of technology. It should be obvious to anyone that a network of these things covering a given area would not be significantly harder to build than a network of cell towers covering the same area.īut when anyone with $5k worth of equipment Trivially, even if that were true, it would only be true if you had a limited number of triggerfish. Only useful for zeroing in… once cooperativeĬell providers had given a general location. Most previous descriptions… suggested thatīecause of range limitations, triggerfish were
Tags: ACLU, courts, EFF, FBI, FOIA, geolocation, privacy, surveillance, tracking In a post on the progressive blog Daily Kos, ACLU spokesperson Rachel Myers drew attention to language in several of those documents implying that triggerfish have broader application than previously believed. Since August, they've received a stream of documents-the most recent batch on November 6-that were posted on the Internet last week. This summer, however, the American Civil Liberties Union and Electronic Frontier Foundation sued the Justice Department, seeking documents related to the FBI's cell-phone tracking practices.
Most previous descriptions of the technology, however, suggested that because of range limitations, triggerfish were only useful for zeroing in on a phone's precise location once cooperative cell providers had given a general location.
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By posing as a cell tower, triggerfish trick nearby cell phones into transmitting their serial numbers, phone numbers, and other data to law enforcement. Triggerfish, also known as cell-site simulators or digital analyzers, are nothing new: the technology was used in the 1990s to hunt down renowned hacker Kevin Mitnick. Government Can Determine Location of Cell Phones without Telco Help